NASSAU, BAHAMAS — The Bahamas Telecommunications Company (BTC) has defeated a former employee’s long-running claim that he was underpaid under a 1999 voluntary disengagement package, with the Supreme Court ruling that his signed release barred the claim and that he failed to prove any breach or financial loss.
Justice Simone Fitzcharles dismissed the breach of contract claim brought by former employee Colyn Hollingsworth, finding that he was not coerced into signing a Deed of Release and had accepted a $226,034.57 disengagement payment in full satisfaction of the money owed to him.
The court also found that Hollingsworth commenced his action after the six-year statutory deadline had expired.
The ruling addresses issues common to 16 additional Supreme Court cases consolidated with Hollingsworth’s action, which was selected as the lead case. However, the judge stressed that her finding that the claim was filed outside the limitation period applies only to Hollingsworth.
Hollingsworth began working for the Grand Bahama Telephone Company, formerly known as Contel, in 1973. He remained employed after BTC’s predecessor, BaTelCo, acquired the company in 1986.
Under the terms of his employment transfer, BaTelCo agreed to recognise Hollingsworth’s previous service when calculating vacation benefits and any involuntary termination payment, provided the termination was not disciplinary.
In 1999, as BaTelCo prepared for privatisation and sought to reduce its workforce, the company offered employees voluntary retirement and disengagement packages.
Hollingsworth accepted a package and signed a Deed of Release. On June 7, 1999, he acknowledged receiving a disengagement payment of $226,034.57 “in full satisfaction of all monies due” upon his departure from the company.
However, Hollingsworth subsequently alleged that BTC failed to credit his years of service with the Grand Bahama Telephone Company when calculating his separation benefits and pension entitlement.
He argued that although the programme was described as voluntary, employees understood that they could be made redundant on less favourable terms if they rejected the offer.
Hollingsworth testified that he was told he would otherwise be dismissed and receive only the benefits available under the industrial agreement. He also claimed that he was required to sign the release before being properly informed of the amount payable and was not given an opportunity to examine the calculation or obtain independent legal advice.
BTC denied breaching its contractual obligations and maintained that participation in the separation exercise was voluntary. The company also argued that Hollingsworth’s signed release prevented him from pursuing any further claim connected to his disengagement.
The court accepted that the possibility of redundancy during a workforce reduction exercise could place an employee under significant pressure. However, Justice Fitzcharles found that commercial pressure or a difficult choice was not, by itself, sufficient to establish legal duress.
“I accept that the prospect of redundancy in the context of a workforce reduction exercise could be a matter of real concern to an employee,” the judge said.
“However, commercial pressure or a difficult choice is not, alone, duress sufficient to vitiate consent.”
Justice Fitzcharles noted that Hollingsworth received and read the staff notice describing the exercise as voluntary and submitted a written application to participate.
The court also found no contemporaneous evidence that he protested, requested more time, sought clarification or indicated that he wanted legal advice before signing the agreement.
The alleged verbal ultimatum was not supported by a written record, and Leon Williams, the BTC executive whom Hollingsworth identified as making the statement, was not called as a witness.
Justice Fitzcharles consequently ruled that Hollingsworth had not established that his consent was undermined by duress.
The judge also found that the wording of the Deed of Release was broad enough to cover the disputed calculation. The document confirmed that the disengagement package represented Hollingsworth’s complete legal entitlement and released BTC from claims associated with his departure.
“The present claim concerns the amount allegedly due to the Claimant as part of his 1999 disengagement package,” Justice Fitzcharles said.
“It is, therefore, a claim ‘in respect of’ the disengagement and plainly falls within the release.”
The court further determined that the case would have failed even without the Deed of Release.
Justice Fitzcharles found that the 1986 employment arrangement expressly required BTC to recognise Hollingsworth’s previous service when calculating vacation benefits and involuntary termination pay.
The 1999 exercise, however, was presented and administered as a voluntary retirement and disengagement programme rather than an involuntary termination scheme.
The court found that Hollingsworth had not established that the voluntary exercise amounted, in substance, to an involuntary termination covered by the 1986 employment terms. He also failed to establish that BTC had not honoured its undertaking regarding vacation benefits.
Hollingsworth further relied on an April 1999 statement that credit would be given for Contel service involving Freeport employees, subject to the deduction of 12 weeks for which they had previously been paid.
The judge did not make a definitive finding on whether that statement created an entitlement to an additional payment in Hollingsworth’s circumstances. She determined that even if such an entitlement existed, he did not prove that BTC failed to give him the required credit or paid him less than he was properly owed.
Hollingsworth could not identify the component of the package to which the previous service should have been applied, the formula that should have been used or the resulting shortfall.
According to the judgment, he acknowledged that he did not know the formula BTC used and could not say whether his Grand Bahama Telephone Company service had been taken into account.
“That may explain why he wanted to obtain further information, but it does not prove a breach or a loss,” Justice Fitzcharles said.
The court also found that Hollingsworth’s action fell outside the six-year period permitted for claims based on a simple contract.
The disputed payment was made on June 7, 1999, meaning that any cause of action arose no later than that date. Hollingsworth’s writ was issued on June 15, 2005—after the limitation period expired.
No allegation of fraud, mistake or deliberate concealment was pleaded that could have postponed the start of the limitation period, according to the judgment.
Justice Fitzcharles dismissed the claim and ordered that BTC receive its legal costs, to be taxed if the parties cannot agree on the amount.
